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ABSTRACT  
Investigations into the causes and effects of parallel importing have concentrated on price 
discrimination, but arbitrage can also occur on non-price dimensions.  Using a natural 
experiment in the New Zealand film distribution industry between May 1998 and 
November 2001, we examine the effect of parallel importing on quality as it relates to the 
timing of the availability of film media.  We demonstrate that a) cinema revenues were 
undermined as consumers substituted viewing films on parallel imported DVDs for the 
cinema format and b) that studios responded to the threat of parallel imported DVDs by 
bringing forward the release of films into New Zealand cinemas. The reduced delay 
between US and New Zealand cinematic release dates is shown to be consistent with the 
introduction of competition when timing is a dimension of quality and choice. We 
conclude that parallel importation of DVDs almost certainly resulted in a net increase in 
welfare in New Zealand. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Parallel importing is the importation of legitimately-produced goods without the consent 
of the relevant copyright, trademark or patent holder (or her agent) in the recipient 
country.1  It is not trade in pirated or counterfeit goods. It is an arbitrage phenomenon 
caused by international differences in price, associated services, availability and quality 
of goods.  Parallel importation restrictions have analogues under competition law that has 
a long legal history. These are vertical restrictions – that may be territorial – imposed in 
domestic economies by manufacturers.2 The rationale for these restrictions in both cases 
is to internalise externalities in distribution such as those relating to product service and 
advertising. The legality of such restrictions has been the subject of a considerable 
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number of antitrust cases.3  
The effect of parallel importation on price and quantity is difficult enough to measure, 
and the assessment of effects on quality is even more difficult. Yet quality effects are an 
important determinant of the social desirability of legal restrictions on parallel 
importation. Parallel importation, for example, may limit even eliminate price premia that 
are used to support after-sales service. In this paper we explain how the parallel 
importation of film affects the quality dimension of timing of availablility and utilise a 
natural experiment to estimate that consequent welfare effects. We conclude that 
provided that investment in film making is unaffected there is a clear increase in welfare 
associated with parallel importation of films. 
Assessing the magnitude of parallel trade flows is difficult because data on parallel 
imports is not systematically collected (Maskus and Chen 2000:4).  However, some 
estimates of parallel trade volumes are available.  NERA (1999:ix) assesses the extent of 
parallel importing in ten sectors within the European Union and estimates parallel trade 
accounts for shares of sales which range up to 15 percent.  Cosac (2003:2) cites a study 
which estimates 20% (worth £1.3 billion) of branded pharmaceuticals sold in the UK in 
2002 were parallel imports.  Maskus and Chen (2000:4) cite an article which claims that 
up to 20% of Coca-Cola products in the UK are sourced from wholesalers in other EU 
countries, and that this trade was caused by differences in wholesale prices.  Arfwedson 
(2004:5-6) cites a study estimating that parallel imports of pharmaceuticals in the EU 
were worth $3.3 billion in 2001 and were forecast to rise to $7.4 billion in 2006. 
The legal mechanism giving effect to restrictions on parallel imports is territorial 
exhaustion of intellectual property rights.  The term “exhaustion” is used because the 
right of the IPR holder to prevent re-sale is said to be “exhausted” when the goods are 
sold (Valletti and Szymanski 2004:3).  The point at which exhaustion occurs can be made 
to depend on the location of the sale.  The extent of the territory in which exhaustion is 
defined to occur sets the conditions under which parallel imports are permitted.  Under 
international exhaustion, rights to control distribution expire after the first sale anywhere 
and parallel imports are allowed.  Under national exhaustion, only the first sale within a 
nation exhausts distribution rights and rights holders may prevent unauthorised imports.  
An intermediate position is regional exhaustion, which permits parallel trade within a 
group of countries that define a region but prohibits parallel imports from outside the 
region. 
Maskus and Chen (2004:553) report that different countries have adopted different 
exhaustion rules.  The European Union has adopted community exhaustion for copyright, 
trademarks and patents, meaning parallel imports between countries inside the EU are 
permitted but are not permitted from outside the EU.  The United States maintains a 
national exhaustion policy for patents and copyright goods, and for trademarked goods 
with some exceptions.  Japan has international exhaustion for trademarks and patents 
(unless agreed by contract or the original sale was subject to price control), and for all 
copyright goods except motion pictures.  Australia has international exhaustion on 
trademarks but national exhaustion on patented goods (unless sold without clear 
restrictions) and all copyright goods except books and CDs.  Most developing countries 
have not restricted parallel trade.4 
                                                
3  McCareins and Neufer (1991) provide a legal commentary on territorial restrictions and their history in a number of 
US cases, and Posner (1977) discusses per se illegality of vertical restraints in the context of a particular case. 
4   See Abbott (1998). 
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The literature on parallel importing identifies international price discrimination and free-
riding as the two main reasons for parallel importing (Maskus and Chen 1999:11).5  The 
price discrimination theory rationalises parallel importing as the arbitrage of differences 
in prices between countries.  These differences come about because the rights holder has 
a strategy of tailoring prices to local conditions.  Under the free-rider hypothesis, parallel 
imports are caused by unauthorised distributors utilising investments in marketing and 
after-sales service by other, licensed, distributors.  To date, the empirical literature has 
considered the discrimination hypothesis in greater depth than it has free-riding. 
In contrast to the volume of economic literature which demonstrates the benefits of open 
international trade (see Wolf 2004 for example), the parallel importing literature is 
equivocal about the effect of parallel trade on welfare.  The empirical literature which 
examines this question in a price discrimination context broadly concludes that permitting 
parallel importing is beneficial provided willingness to pay among consumers in different 
countries is not “too” heterogeneous, and rules on parallel importing should be decided 
for each industry on merit rather than globally (see Mauleg and Schwartz 1994; Anderson 
and Ginsburg 1999; Cosac 2003; Maskus and Chen 2004; Valletti and Szymanski 2004).  
Parallel importing seems to exemplify the tension that exists between intellectual property 
rights and any enhanced investment incentives on the one hand and gains from immediate 
competition and trade on the other. 
This paper estimates welfare effects of parallel importing when it affects quality.  We 
make use of a natural experiment in the New Zealand film industry which was recently 
subjected to the introduction and subsequent removal of parallel imported DVDs. The 
ability to parallel import reduces licensed film distributors’ control of various dimensions, 
in particular timing and variety. The timing dimension arises as the result of the 
international sequential releases of films in cinemas and on DVD and VHS.  Film owners 
(hereafter ‘studios’) stagger release dates for a number of reasons, including lowering 
production costs, and preserving investment options while costly uncertainty is resolved.  
Parallel importing undermines staggered release because DVDs from early-release 
countries can be exported to late-release countries, in some cases arriving prior to the 
film’s release in cinemas.  Cinema revenues are undermined when consumers substitute 
viewing the film in cinemas for buying or renting a DVD. The variety of films will be 
affected by any altered scheduling of films and any effect on the total number of films 
released over time.  
We argue that the introduction of parallel importing will result in shorter delays in the 
release of films and reduce, to a limited extent, the variety of films in cinemas.  However, 
increased competition under parallel importing will enhance the variety of films made 
available on other media, and we expect film variety not to diminish overall. Using a 
natural experiment between 1998 and 2001 in which DVDs were parallel imported into 
New Zealand for rental, we estimate that for films subject to parallel importing, the 
substitution from cinema to DVD media caused a statistically significant decline in New 
Zealand cinema revenues, and that licensed film distributors responded to the threat of 
parallel importing by bringing forward the release dates of films into New Zealand 
cinemas. The natural experiment was terminated in November 2001 when it was 
determined that parallel importation for rental per se was illegal. 
                                                
5   Hilke (1988:77-83) identifies five causes of parallel importing: free-riding on retailer-provided services, geographic 
price discrimination by manufacturers, manufacturer efforts to set maximum retail prices, consumer deception, and 
distributor collusion.  Hilke concludes the evidence tends to favour changes in the exchange rate and manufacturer 
price discrimination as being the principal causes of parallel importing. 
  
4. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we outline changes in the regulation of 
parallel importing in New Zealand in the last decade.  In section 3 we describe the 
essential features of film and DVD distribution in New Zealand, and the means by which 
parallel importing affects each format.  In section 4 we provide a qualitative description 
of the effects of parallel importing on aggregate surplus produced in New Zealand film 
distribution.  In section 5 we examine the effects of parallel importing using film and 
DVD timing and revenues data.  Section 6 concludes. 
II. A NATURAL EXPERIMENT IN PARALLEL IMPORTING 
By the end of the 1990s, New Zealand had had a long-standing and relatively pervasive 
policy of national exhaustion for copyright goods.6  National exhaustion was effected by 
defining copyright goods imported without the consent of the New Zealand copyright 
owner to be infringing.  This changed with the passage of the Copyright (Removal of 
Prohibition on Parallel Importing) Amendment Act 1998 in May 1998.  The Act 
permitted the parallel importing of all copyright goods by replacing the consent of the 
New Zealand copyright owner (or her agent) with the consent of the overseas copyright 
owner, effectively substituting international exhaustion for national exhaustion.7  In a 
single unanticipated step, New Zealand had moved from a restrictive to a wholly 
unhindered parallel importing regime. 
The 1998 Act made clear that parallel importing DVDs and VHS tapes into New Zealand 
for sale was legal, but it was ambiguous as to whether parallel importing for rental was 
permitted.  In spite of this uncertainty (or because of it), parallel imported DVDs began to 
flow into New Zealand video rental stores in mid 1999, and by 2001 thousands of copies 
were entering the country for rental.  The ambiguity was resolved in a test case in the 
High Court in November 2001.  In Video Ezy (New Zealand) Ltd v Roadshow 
Entertainment (New Zealand) Ltd,8 the High Court held that Parliament did not intend 
that the scope of the rental rights granted under the Copyright Act 1994 should apply to 
parallel imported copies of works protected under New Zealand copyright law.9  With the 
legislative ambiguity resolved, the parallel importing of DVDs for rental in New Zealand 
ceased.  Legislation in 2003 extended the right of copyright owners to prohibit the sale of 
parallel imported films within nine months of the first international release of a film. 
A natural experiment is created by the 2½ year period in which parallel importing of 
DVD films occurred.  The purpose of this paper is to examine empirically the effect of 
parallel importing on distributors and exhibitors, and consumers.  
A. Parallel Importing and the IPR Dilemma 
                                                
6   High Court cases in 1996 and 1997 held that the rights of copyright owners were not exhausted even after two or 
more international sales of goods, meaning second-hand goods imported without consent were infringing. In 
Composite Developments (NZ) Ltd v Kebab Capital Ltd and Another, CP 174/96, High Court, Auckland 10 May 
1996 (Salmon J) the plaintiff successfully sought to restrain the importation of second-hand skis and snowboards of 
French manufacture and design. In Lyntec Holdings Ltd v Wills, Unrep, CP 11/97, High Court, Auckland, 29 January 
1997, (Robertson J), new and second-hand jet skis had been imported, with both types being deemed to have 
breached the 1994 Act. 
7   Section 12(5A) b.i appeared to allow unauthorised copies to be imported into New Zealand. Under subpara (i), once 
the copyright has expired in the exporting country any third party can import into New Zealand unauthorised copies 
without infringing copyright. With some countries not bound by international obligations, it appeared the door had 
been left open to an individual country to grant only a limited term to copyright and, once that copyright has expired, 
any unauthorised copyright goods may be manufactured and legally exported from that country to New Zealand. 
8   [2002] 1 NZLR 855, (2002) 7 NZBLC 103, 524. 
9   Andrew Brown provides a useful summary of the case at http://www.andrewbrown.co.nz/recent/videoezy.asp 
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There is no consensus in legal or economic scholarship on the desirability of parallel 
importing.  The utility of parallel importing depends on whether monopoly rights on 
production conferred under copyright are usefully extended to alienable monopoly rights 
on distribution between, but not within, countries.  Answering this question requires a 
definitive position on, firstly, whether the benefit of extending a monopoly intellectual 
right outweighs the benefit of unhindered inter-country distribution of goods, and 
secondly whether inter-country trade is the appropriate level of granularity since other 
levels (relating to the movement of goods between individuals, for example) are 
theoretically possible. 
The optimal treatment of parallel importing is part of a wider question on the optimal 
scope of intellectual property rights.  Lemley (2004) summarises the position on this issue 
as follows: 
The proliferation of economic literature on intellectual property over the last two decades 
has improved our understanding of the economics of innovation and intellectual property 
considerably, but it has not given us a magic bullet or told us where to draw the line 
between protection and the public domain. Instead, it has taught us that there is no one 
right answer. The optimal scope, strength and duration of intellectual property protection 
depend on the type of creation at issue, on the nature of innovation in the particular 
industry in question, on the particular kind of invention (and inventor) at issue, and on 
the market context. They may also depend on the sort of information that is at issue. The 
problem is further complicated by the fact that we must take into account other means 
intellectual property owners have of enforcing rights, including contract and 
technological protection. Given this, it is hard – and perhaps even impossible – to ever 
calibrate intellectual property law perfectly. 
The relationship between intellectual property rights and welfare is commonly visualised 
as an inverted ‘U’, where the horizontal axis is the extent of protection offered by 
intellectual property rights.  At one extreme on this axis, there is no protection of 
intellectual property rights, the economic incentives for innovation are diminished, and 
welfare is low.  At the other extreme, broad intellectual property rights that are strongly 
enforced discourage innovation by raising the cost of original expression.  These costs 
include the effort required to search for previous creative inventions to ensure the 
expression is original, as well as impairing access to existing ideas useful to the creation 
of new ideas.  The social value of parallel importing will almost certainly lie between 
these extremes.  
Because parallel importing is frequently the result of price differences (Hilke 1988), there 
has been economic analysis of parallel importing in the context of price discrimination.  
The question of whether parallel importing restrictions are desirable is transformed to a 
question of whether international third degree price discrimination, which it is assumed 
parallel importing undermines, is desirable.10  However, even in this framework 
estimating the welfare effect of parallel importing is difficult because, except in special 
circumstances, the welfare effects of price discrimination are ambiguous and require 
quantification in order to reach a view.11  Empirical studies of parallel importing in a 
price discrimination framework have come to varying conclusions about the effect of 
                                                
10  Third degree price discrimination occurs when different prices are charged for the same good on the basis of 
customer characteristics. 
11   Carlton and Perloff (2000:290). A concrete result to emerge from the discrimination literature is from Varian 
(1985) who shows that a necessary condition for price discrimination to raise welfare is that total output increases; 
but this relates to an homogeneous good. The difficulty and the importance of measuring the welfare effects of the 
introduction of goods with new qualities are discussed by Hausman (2003).   
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parallel importing on welfare.  Maskus and Chen (1999) maintain the net benefit of 
parallel importing depends on the specific circumstances, and argue policymakers should 
adopt a rule of reason approach.  
The difficulty policymakers have had in locating the optimal bundle of property rights 
granted to innovators is reflected in various attempts either to preserve the status quo,12 or 
to draw arbitrary distinctions in the treatment of parallel importing.  There is, for 
example, no automatic distinction in economics between the sale and rental of durable 
goods.  Renting is simply a special form of sale of services, an agreement to re-sell the 
good back to the renter at a price agreed in advance.  Yet different treatment for parallel 
imported goods depending on whether they are used for rental or sale is enshrined in both 
the TRIPS agreement and New Zealand legislation.13  The lack of distinction between 
renting and sale is epitomised in the difficulty negotiators of the TRIPS agreement had 
when attempting to define the term “rental”, as the following draft definition illustrates:14 
... rental shall mean the disposal [for a limited period of time] of the possession of the 
original or copies for [direct profit-making purposes][direct or indirect commercial 
advantages]. 
The square bracketed sections denote the parts of the definition to be negotiated.  The 
definition was ultimately abandoned and although Article 11 of TRIPS is directed at 
renting, the final version of TRIPS does not define what renting means.15  The arbitrary 
legal distinction between sale and rental helps define the natural experiment we use in 
this study. 
I. NEW ZEALAND FILM DISTRIBUTION 
The New Zealand final consumption cinema industry is relatively successful.  In 2002 
New Zealand had the fifth highest cinema admissions per capita in the world.16  New 
Zealand real box office revenues increased 34% between 1997 and 2003; 2000 was the 
only year in this period in which revenues declined.17 
Cinematic distribution of films in New Zealand is carried out by twelve distributors, a 
mix of subsidiaries and local agents of overseas studios.  Film distributors do not have a 
financial interest in New Zealand cinemas.  Cinemas retain 55-60% of box office 
revenues and distributors receive the balance, from which the costs of importing are 
funded.18  The decision to distribute a film domestically is made by local distributors, 
subject to studio approval.  Distributors group cinemas into three tiers (city, suburban, 
and provincial) and have standard revenue recovery percentages from each group.  These 
rates are negotiable. 
Local distributors obtain film prints at cost.  A new print costs approximately US$2,500 
                                                
12 The introduction of legislation restricting parallel importing of DVDs, was specifically directed at protecting New 
Zealand cinema chains from parallel importing. It was instigated by evidence presented to the Minister that parallel 
importing had had a demonstrable effect on cinema revenues. 
13 World Trade Organisation (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. 
14 Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, 
“Status Of Work In The Negotiating Group: Chairman's Report to the GNG,” MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76, 23 July 
1990. Available from http://www.ipmall.info/hosted_resources/trips/W76.pdf 
15 We thank Warwick Rothnie for his input in this section.  
16 Source: Australian Film Commission http://www.afc.gov.au/gtp/acompadmitper.html 
17 Source: Columbia Tristar. 
18 Source: Columbia Tristar. 
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plus shipping.19  A second-hand print is obtained by local distributors for only the cost of 
shipping. 
Films are sequentially released on to various formats, with cinema generally being the 
first.  Subsequently, films are released on DVD/VHS for sale and rental (3 to 6 months 
after cinema release), pay-per-view television (7 to 9 months later), pay TV (12 months 
later) and finally free-to-air television (minimum 24 months later).20  Studios employ 
sequential release of films on different media and strategic pricing, in which the price of 
access to films falls with time after release, as strategies to maximise net revenues.21  
Local distributors are selective in the foreign films they distribute.  Approximately 25% 
of films shown in US cinemas are not selected for cinematic release in New Zealand.22  
The constraint on local cinematic release is expected profitability, not limited available 
screen space.  Expectations of profitability take into account the marketing exposure that 
cinematic release has on subsequent DVD sales and rental. 
Studios stagger the international release of films and obtain three benefits from this.  
First, delay permits a substantial saving by using second-hand film reels.  The cost of new 
film prints constitute the largest cost item of a “day and date” (i.e. no delay) cinematic 
release.23  Quality problems with second hand reels occasionally occur, but in general 
used film reels are of substantially the same quality as new film reels. 
Second, inter-country staggering of releases informs expectations about the commercial 
success of a film which is substantially (but not entirely) resolved when overseas 
performance is observed.  Third, staggering permits the management of local release 
times to avoid inter-film conflict and coincide with local holidays and seasons, thereby 
raising revenues. 
Delay is not without cost, however.  Staggered release dates mean contributions to fixed 
production costs arrive later, which is costly.  They also increase opportunities for piracy, 
which, depending on the country, is a major concern for studios and distributors. 
Not all cinematic releases are staggered.  Major blockbusters and films deemed to carry a 
strong likelihood of success will be released in a number of countries at about the same 
time as in the US.  Day and date release occurs when marketing spillover effects are 
deemed strong enough to justify foregoing the benefits of delay. 
Video and DVD rental distribution occurs via a number of independent chain video 
stores.  Studios supply video stores under two distribution models.  Under one model, 
video stores purchase DVDs outright.  Under the second model, a revenue sharing 
arrangement is instituted. Studio distributors supply VHS and DVD releases to rental 
stores at no charge and collect a percentage of rental fees.  Because royalties are paid only 
when rental occurs,  risk is shared, and any financial constraint for the video rental store 
alleviated.  More copies are available for renting and consumers benefit from reduced 
congestion and waiting times. 
                                                
19 http://www.michaeldvd.com.au/Articles/FutureOfCinema/FutureOfCinema.html 
20 Source: Columbia Tristar. Many films are released directly to DVD or VHS and not shown in cinemas. 
21 Varian (2000) shows that offering rental and for-sale versions of information goods such as films can raise profits 
(and welfare) by allowing distributors to reach “poor” consumers via rental and “rich” consumers via purchase. 
Rental is a means of reaching consumers who would otherwise go unserved.  Interestingly, Varian notes the initial 
opposition of film studios to home video rental. 
22 Source: Columbia Tristar.  According to Columbia, the constraining factor on films shown in New Zealand is not the 
limited number of screens but profitability.  An instance where a profitable film has been unable to be shown as a 
result of unavailability of screens has not occurred. 
23 Source: Columbia Tristar. 
  
8. 
A. Effect of Parallel Importing on Film Distribution 
When parallel importing is permitted, staggering the release dates of films into cinemas 
and subsequently on to other formats creates an arbitrage opportunity that is depicted in 
Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Release is Staggered by Media Type and By Country (Approximate Months Delay in 
Brackets).24 
Figure 1 shows that the cinema release of a film will be followed by the DVD version of 
the film approximately three months later.  In the example, the US DVD release date 
coincides with the New Zealand cinema release date.  When parallel importing is 
permitted, the US DVD may be imported to New Zealand, and appear in New Zealand 
rental stores as the film is released in cinemas. The DVD is a substitute format to viewing 
the film in cinemas. Parallel importing reduces studios’ ability to profitably stagger the 
international cinematic release of films because of competition from (legitimately 
produced) DVD and VHS copies of a film from an early-release country which may be 
imported into a late-release country before the official release of these films on that 
format in the receiving country.25  If parallel importing of the kind shown in Figure 1 is 
pervasive then, if lobbying the government for protection from parallel importing is 
unsuccessful, studios may find it profitable to reduce arbitrage opportunities by limiting 
either (or both) international staggering and format staggering. 
Among the mainstream films we surveyed, the United States is, on average, the first to 
exhibit a film.26  Figure 2 compares the average number of days that films are staggered 
relative to the US.  In New Zealand, 31.9% of films released locally occur more than four 
months after the US cinema release date and 17.8% occur more than six months later.  
                                                
24 Home video or VHS release usually coincides with the DVD release, not represented here because VHS is not 
parallel imported, for reasons we discuss below. 
25 By “official” we mean the release date as decided by the rights owner or her agent in that country. 
26 Marvasti and Canterbery (2005) report the number of films produced by country in 1991-1995, The number 
produced by the USA was markedly in excess of all countries except India which produced 827 per annum. In the 
same periood they report that New Zealand averaged 5.2 per annum. 
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There is an implied arbitrage opportunity for DVD parallel imports from the US into New 
Zealand for between a third and a sixth of all movie releases, because the time between 
cinematic and DVD release of a film averages three months.   
0 50 100 150 200
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Figure 2: Average Number of Days Delay After US Cinematic Release. Source: www.imdb.com. 
Data on New Zealand box office revenues 1997-2003 indicate the impact of parallel 
importing was significant.  The parallel importing of DVDs, which peaked in 2000 and 
2001, appears to have strongly affected cinematic box office revenues.  Figure 3 shows 
that New Zealand cinemas experienced a sharp reduction in box office receipts in 2000: 
real revenues fell 13% compared to 1999 mostly as a result of lower admissions; real 
prices were relatively unaffected.  Revenues increased sharply in the year following the 
cessation of parallel importing in November 2001. 
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Figure 3: Real Box Office Revenue and Price and Admissions 1997-2003 (1997=100). Source: 
New Zealand Film Distributors Association, DVD World.27  
The apparent effect of parallel imported DVDs on cinema admissions occurred in spite of 
three factors which inhibit the availability of parallel imported DVDs.28  First, the 
revenue sharing arrangement between authorised distributors and video rental outlets is 
not available for parallel importers.  Parallel imported DVDs must be purchased from 
overseas wholesalers outright, and thus options for financing supply and the sharing of 
risk are limited.  This constrains the quantities of DVDs on rental store shelves to only a 
few copies – perhaps only one.29  Secondly, New Zealand censorship laws require that the 
first imported copy of a film on each format must obtain a censor’s rating at a fixed price 
of NZ$1,500 per film.  Where parallel imports of DVDs are first to market in that format, 
the importer is required to pay the censor’s fee.  The limited volumes of parallel imports 
of each film, a result of the lack of revenue sharing, mean the censor’s fee constitutes a 
                                                
27 Excludes revenues and admissions from the Lord of the Rings trilogy.  These films were produced in New Zealand 
and are the first, second and fourth highest grossing films in New Zealand cinema history.  They were an anomalous 
or one-off source of revenue in 2001, 2002 and 2003 and therefore excluded.  These films were released into 
domestic cinemas “day and date” with overseas cinemas and are therefore not affected by parallel importing.  The 
exclusion of the trilogy raises a question about substitution, in particular whether the reduction in cinema revenues in 
2000 and 2001, as shown in Figure 3, reflects substitution away from other films and towards the excluded trilogy.  
This seems unlikely: revenues were depressed before the arrival of the first film in the trilogy and recovered the year 
after the release of the first film in 2001.  This is consistent with the effective abolition of parallel imported DVD 
rentals at the end of 2001, and not with the exclusion of the trilogy. 
28 In section III we formally test the effect of parallel importing controlling for the quality and timing of released films. 
29 Source: DVD World, the principal parallel importer of DVDs in New Zealand between 1998 and 2001. 
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significant hurdle.30  A third disadvantage is that parallel imported DVDs generally ship 
with out-of-region encoding meaning that an all-region DVD player is required to view 
the DVD.31  The express purpose of the regional encoding system is to segment the world 
and protect the staggered cinematic release of films (Gans, King and Dunt 2001:4). The 
increasing availability of all-region DVD players has undermined this impediment.  
II. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PARALLEL IMPORTING 
In this section we compare the various costs and benefits that studios, distributors and 
consumers of films bear with and without parallel importing.  The costs and benefits of 
parallel importing in the film industry are determined by the producer and consumer 
behavioural responses that parallel importing induces.  We classify the costs and benefits 
of parallel importing as falling into the following categories. 
• Utility arising from timing of the availability of films to consumers; 
• Utility arising from the variety of films available to consumers; 
• The price of film consumption to consumers; 
• The investment in film provision to consumers over time; and advertising to inform 
consumers about films; 
• Profits of studios and their distributors, which are determined by: 
 production and distribution costs; and 
 revenue earned on a film via various media. 
We presume that consumers prefer to view films as close to release dates as possible, a 
view we justify below. We maintain that New Zealand parallel import policies will not 
affect the supply of films from any country. New Zealand is a very small market and its 
policies towards film release will negligibly affect revenues from films produced in any 
country. Adverse effects on investment in New Zealand-produced films are only likely if 
a parallel import ban can be expected to diminish revenue from such films, since it may 
be assumed that production costs will not be affected.  New Zealand is a very small 
country and successful films produced there rely on international consumption for their 
success: clearly this opportunity will not be diminished by parallel importation policy 
which affects only the means by which overseas films are released locally. Under parallel 
importation, all New Zealand made and oriented films may have to compete in the local 
market with a wider variety of more timely releases of foreign films at potentially lower 
cost. It is unlikely that this would generate any more competition for New Zealand 
oriented films because such films are differentiated from films made in other countries. 
Indeed, for such films to be of benefit to consumers in the short and long term, they 
                                                
30 Records obtained from DVD World shows that 41,993 copies of 307 films were imported during this period.  On 
these amounts, and assuming a censor’s fee was payable on each title, the censor’s fee of NZ$1,500 would average 
NZ$10.97 per copy.  This is significant when the retail price of a new DVD is around NZ$40 (including GST).  For 
45.9% of titles, less than fifty copies were imported and in this sample the average censor’s fee, if payable for each 
title and assuming compliance, is $87.90 per copy. 
31 The DVD format is designed with a coding system that divides the world into six regions.  As examples, the system 
places USA and Canada in Region 1 and Australia and New Zealand in Region 4.  The region coding system 
requires that each country is provided DVDs and DVD players specific to that region. Region-specific DVD players 
will not play a region-incompatible DVD, precluding, in principle, parallel imports between regions.  This system is 
undermined by all-region DVD players which permit DVDs of any region to be viewed. 
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should pass this test of competition.32  Protecting local film production by means of 
parallel importing restriction is analogous to a tariff, a particularly inefficient form of 
protection.  Even if greater local production is considered a priority by government, other 
policy options with superior efficiency exist (Carlton and Perloff 2000:581-2). We 
presume that production incentives for New Zealand made and oriented films need not be 
considered in our welfare assessment.  
A. The Delay Option 
A temporal monopoly in the introduction of a film to a market confers an option to delay 
the issuance to a date that maximises expected net revenue. This delay is valuable as it 
confers net benefits when there is investment under uncertainty and at least some 
irreversibility of investment (Dixit and Pindyck 1994).  Irreversibility arises when 
investments are sunk and not recoverable, once made. They are present when a film is 
released and in film promotional expenditures. The option to delay is likely to be relevant 
in varying degrees in most industries affected by parallel importing.  To our knowledge, 
the empirical literature has not conducted an explicit assessment of parallel importing 
where timing is an important element of quality. Assuming that the production of films is 
unaffected the welfare effects of the option to delay materially affect the desirability of 
parallel importing. A ban on parallel importing attenuates film-specific monopoly supply 
and promotes competitive media.  
The real options literature suggests that monopoly firms invest later than is socially 
desirable because they do not include in their profit consumers’ surplus relating to their 
investment.  Competition brings forward investment in the presence of options to delay as 
firms pre-empt investment by others.  However, the literature is still evolving.  Lambrecht 
and Perraudin (2003) find in their model (based on a basic investment timing option, 
modified so that two firms compete for the right to move first and capture  the whole 
market; firms know their own cost structure, but not their competitor’s) that the delay 
option can be worth anything between zero and the usual  monopolistic option value.  In 
contrast, Grenadier (2002) looks at the effect of competition on firms’ investment timing 
options and finds that the option value falls to zero.  Novy-Marx (2004) argues that 
Grenadier’s result follows from his assumption that the production technology is linear 
and incremental.  These are standard assumptions under perfect competition and are 
hardly met in the film distribution industry, where there are considerable scale economies 
in information goods and advertising.  In an equilibrium model Novy-Marx discovers that 
competition can actually elevate the value of firms’ investment timing options above the 
monopolistic option value, possibly increasing incentives to delay.  Dixit and Pindyck 
(1994, chapter 8) find that competition reduces but does not eliminate the (option) value 
of waiting compared to monopoly.  
In short, under a parallel import ban of films suppliers are less competitive in distribution 
and they may wait perhaps too long to invest relative to the welfare optimum delay, 
because they share investment surplus with consumers.33  However, competition between 
films may provide sufficient risk of costly pre-emption so that investment occurs at an 
approximately optimal time; although, in the case of films, laws protect studios from 
                                                
32 Marvasti and Canterbery op cit, explain the enigma of the USA’s dramatic film export performance, in the presence 
of no barriers to entry of films to the USA, but barriers to export, to economies of scale, English language and the 
qualities of stars. They argue that export revenues, including those of DVDs, approached domestic revenues in 1999; 
and that the export revenue was essential to the survival of a number of USA studios. 
33 Based on the total surplus standard of producer plus consumer surplus. 
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unauthorised public showings and no inter-firm competition for the cinematic release of a 
film can occur.  
In the presence of a parallel importing ban there remains competition between films and 
this may induce the optimum delay.  It may mean that increased competition (under an 
international exhaustion rule), investment may occur too soon relative to a welfare-
maximising optimum because firms attempt to avoid costly pre-emption.   
In sum, while the real options provides a suitable framework for assessment of whether 
competition (parallel importing) or monopoly will optimise welfare, it does not make 
general statements about the relative performance of competition versus monopoly, and 
the net benefits of parallel importing are likely to be industry-specific.  From a policy 
perspective, a rule of reason approach may therefore be preferred to global rules about 
this form of importing. 
The following analysis assumes that the staggered release of films around the world 
requires effective separation of markets and that this staggering is undermined by parallel 
importing.  The welfare effect of parallel importing is thus given by a comparison of 
welfare without  and with staggered release dates.   
B. Effect of Parallel Importing On Delay and Variety 
Consumers value variety because it increases the opportunities for the available mix of 
goods to match their heterogeneous preferences.34  The net effect of parallel importing on 
film variety is potentially ambiguous.  It is possible that the variety of films released in 
cinemas will decline for the following reason.  Box office revenues on delayed films are 
reduced by competition from parallel imports.  When “day and date” release of a film is 
uneconomic on costly new film reels, and delayed release of that film is made 
uneconomic by parallel importing, that film will not be released in cinemas and the 
variety of cinema releases declines.  However, we expect increased media competition 
and lower costs of provision under parallel importing will increase the variety of films on 
other media formats, and may induce a competitive reaction in cinematic film variety.  
On balance we expect film variety not to diminish under parallel importing.35 
Figure 4 shows the number of films released in New Zealand per year.  There were two 
consecutive reductions in the numbers of films distributed in 2001 and 2002 followed by 
a record high number of cinematic film releases in 2003.  Unfortunately, Figure 4 does 
not inform changes in variety because the rate at which films are released also depends on 
delay, which we have shown changed substantially during and immediately after the 
sample period.  The reduction in film releases in 2002 as shown in Figure 4 is consistent 
with an increase in average delay immediately after parallel importing ended as shown in 
Figure 5: we expect a lower density of films during the period of transition from short 
average delay to longer average delay which occurred following termination of parallel 
importing in November 2001.  Accordingly, our data cannot inform us of the effect of 
parallel importing on film variety in cinemas. 
                                                
34 Krugman (1979) provides the seminal work on the efficiency implications of variety. Broda and Weinstein (2004) 
estimate the welfare gains from growth in import varieties between 1972 and 2001 constitute 2.8 percent of US 
GDP. 
35 A reduction in the variety of films released into cinemas does not automatically imply a net reduction in welfare. We 
argue parallel importing is likely to be associated with an offsetting increase in variety of films on other media 
formats, and we demonstrate it is associated with shorter delays in cinema release.  These improvements are 
valuable, and in our view almost certainly outweigh the costs. 
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Figure 4: Number of Films Released in New Zealand Cinemas 1997-2003. Source: Motion 
Picture Distributors Association.36 
Parallel importing reduces delay (see Figure 5) because films which are delayed are 
threatened by the early arrival of parallel imported DVDs.  Films released approximately 
“day and date” with overseas first release avoid this threat entirely. 
                                                
36 Includes films released by independent distributors.  In 2003, 42% of films were released by independents. 
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Figure 5: Average US-NZ Days Difference In Release Dates 1997-2002.37 
Both our theoretical and empirical results (described below) indicate parallel importing 
reduces the average delay in the domestic release of films by increasing the cost of delay 
for distributors.  That consumers value consumption sooner rather than later is standard in 
consumer theory.38 However, early consumption seems particularly important in the 
consumption of information goods such as films. The natural experiment of parallel 
importing of DVDs into New Zealand between 1998 and 2001 demonstrates the 
proclivity for consuming films soon after release.  Parallel imported DVDs arrived in 
video rental stores at approximately the time of a film’s release in cinemas attracted 
substantial premiums.  Whereas new release DVDs that arrived 3 to 6 months after 
cinematic release rented for $7 a night, parallel imported DVDs made available during a 
film’s run in cinemas rented for $10 a night.  Renters of these parallel imported DVDs 
were willing to pay a premium of 40% knowing that the rental price would be reduced to 
$7 in a matter of weeks.  This indicates that, for some consumers at least, the cost of 
delay is substantial.  
Parallel importing may also affect the marketing decisions of film distributors.  
Consumers value marketing as a means of reducing search costs.  If parallel importing of 
DVDs reduces box office earnings on late-release films, then the marginal revenue earned 
                                                
37 Outliers are defined as having an absolute delay exceeding one year. 
38 Individuals have personal discount rates that weight consumption in the present more heavily than in the future.  The 
personal discount rate is measurable.  A recent study by Warner and Pleeter (2001) looked at a US military 
drawdown program in the early 1990s.  On separation from the US military, officers could select either lump sum 
payment or an annuity.  Officers’ personal discount rates can be inferred from their selection, and it was found that 
these selections were consistent with discount rates of between 17.5% and 19.8%.  This is well in excess of normal 
investment discount rates, and implies individuals value the future relatively little.  In other words, individuals attach 
a relatively high cost of delay.  Warner and Pleeter also report on previous studies in the past 25 years have found 
personal discount rates ranging from 1% to 243%.  They also report studies found hyperbolic discount rates (higher 
discounts attached to short delays).  
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on advertising is reduced, and optimal marketing expenditure will decline. 
We have not been able to obtain data on marketing expenditure by New Zealand film 
distributors, but film distributors have advised us that while no formal adjustment to 
marketing expenditure occurred in response to parallel importing, a reduction may have 
occurred had parallel importing of DVDs for rental continued beyond November 2001.   
III. QUANTIFYING THE EFFECT OF PARALLEL IMPORTING 
After a sustained increase in (real) box office revenues, New Zealand distributors 
reported a reduction in 2000, the first year that parallel importing of DVDs became 
significant.  The reduction was attributed to the substitution of parallel imported DVDs 
sold or rented to consumers.  We test whether parallel importing significantly affected 
box office revenues after controlling for film quality and timing.  We also investigate 
whether parallel importing was associated with a shortened cinematic release delay.  That 
there was some timing effect is strongly suggested by Figure 6. 
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Figure 6:  Relative Frequency of Days Delay from US Cinema Release: New Zealand Cinema, 
Parallel Import DVD and Licensed DVD Releases (1997-2002).39 
                                                
39 Outliers have been removed from these distributions for clarity.  Removed outliers represent 1% of the Cinema 
Release distribution, 14% of the Parallel Import DVD distribution, and 7% of the Licensed DVD/VHS distribution. 
Outliers are included in statistical testing. 
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To test the effect of parallel importing on box office revenues, we specify the following 
model:40 
!"#$%& ++'+++=
iiii
US
i
NZ
i
EDPIPIRR  
where NZ
i
R is New Zealand box office revenue of film i, 
US
i
R is US box office revenue of film i, 
i
PI is a dummy indicating whether there is record of film i being parallel  
imported on DVD format (=1 if parallel imported),  
ii
DPI ! is the product of dummy variable 
i
PI  and  
i
D  which is the number of days between New Zealand cinematic release  and 
parallel import release date; and  
i
E  is the number of days between US and New Zealand cinema release of a film.   
The US box office revenue controls for the entertainment value of the film. We expect the 
sign of the coefficient on this variable to be positive and near unity if the tastes of the US 
populace are similar to those of New Zealand. In accord with our hypothesis of the effect 
of parallel importing on the monopoly media, we expect a negative sign on the dummy 
variable PI.  The interaction effect of delay and revenue (PI.D) we expect to be positive 
in that a parallel import that arrives later has a less-negative effect on cinema revenues. 
The coefficient on the delayed release variable E could be either positive or negative.  If 
longer delay tends to make local release dates coincide with holidays and long weekends 
then a positive coefficient is expected.  On the other hand, long delays may quell demand 
for a film; and hence longer delay may be associated with a reduction in revenue.41 The 
data sources are described in the Appendix. 
A. Findings 
In this section we report the estimated model specified to explain cinema-revenue effects, 
and other models aimed at examining in more detail the timing hypothesis. 
We draw four observations from the estimated revenue model reported in Table 1.  First, 
parallel importing has a negative impact on New Zealand box office revenues at the 5% 
level of significance.  Second, the positive sign of the interaction dummy coefficient 
indicates that the effect of parallel importing on New Zealand cinemas’ revenues is lower 
the later parallel imports arrive, though this effect is not statistically significant.  This is 
consistent with our theory that arrivals of DVDs during a film’s run in cinemas 
undermine box office revenues.  Third, the elasticity of New Zealand box office revenues 
with respect to the US box office are significantly different from unity.  We estimate a 
1% increase in US box office revenue is associated with only a 0.78% increase in New 
Zealand box office revenue. This will reflect different film tastes of consumers in each 
country, and the fact that New Zealand consumers have more information about a film 
when it first appears in cinemas in that country. Fourth, after controlling for parallel 
importing, the delay in the cinematic release of a film is associated with a reduction in 
revenues as indicated by the negative sign of the cinematic release delay variable. 
                                                
40 The continuous variables are in natural logarithms and we interpret the associated coefficients as elasticities. 
41 There is potentially an endogeneity problem with this variable for which we do not have a good instrument. 
Distributors systematically release “blockbusters” sooner than other films, meaning short delay will be 
systematically related to high box office (not withstanding the control variable for US box office revenues). 
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Table 1: Estimated Revenue Model.42 
Independent Variables Coefficient (standard error) 
Intercept +10.9843*** (0.3023) 
US Box Office +0.7636*** (0.0632) 
Parallel Import Dummy -0.3409** (0.1518) 
Interactive Dummy +0.0015* (0.0009) 
Cinematic Release Delay -0.0054*** (0.0013) 
R2 = 0.6889; Adj R2 = 0.6820; F = 98.5594; Obs = 183. 
*** significant at level of 1%. 
** significant at level of 5%. 
* significant at level of 10%. 
 
We now consider more formally whether parallel importing affects the timing of film 
releases, using the following simple model: 
!"# ++=
ii
DE  
where, as in the previous model, Ei is the number of days between US and New Zealand 
release dates of film i and Di is a dummy indicating whether the US release date of the 
film is in the period during which parallel imported DVDs were entering the country for 
rental.  We use a period dummy to assess the the threat of parallel importing, as much as 
actual parallel on delay.  We define the period of parallel importing to start at the date 
that the first parallel imported DVD arrived on 31 March 1999 according to data collected 
from records at a Wellington video rental store. The period is defined as ending on 30 
November 2001 when the Video Ezy rental decision occurred.  We estimate the equation 
using a data set of all films released in the US and New Zealand with US release dates 
between 1 January 1997 and 31 December 2002.  We exclude films released in the US in 
2003 because of the proximity to the end of 2003 at the time of this study is likely to bias 
the observed delay downwards (films released in 2003 with long delays will not yet have 
arrived in New Zealand).  
We estimate the model on the full data set (792 observations) and a subset of films which 
earned over US$10 million in US box office revenues (403 observations).43  The results 
are reported in Table 2. 
                                                
42 The Lord of the Rings trilogy has been excluded from observations (see footnote 27). All standard errors estimated 
using White’s 1980  covariance matrix that is robust against serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. 
43 Data on films earnings revenues over US$10 million from www.boxofficereport.com. 
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Table 2: Effect of Parallel Importing on Delay44  
Independent Variables Full Data Set 
Coefficient 
(standard error) 
$10M Min Revenue Subset 
Coefficient 
(standard error) 
Intercept 220.24 *** 
(17.1183) 
96.68*** 
(5.64) 
Parallel Import Period Dummy -96.91 *** 
(20.23) 
+5.45 
(7.95) 
 R
2 = 0.03; Adj R2 = 0.03; 
F= 22.64; Obs = 792 
R2 = 0.00; Adj R2 = -0.00; 
F= 0.46; Obs = 403 
*** significant at level of 1%. 
 
Table 2 indicates that in the full data set parallel importing reduced the average delay 
between US and New Zealand cinema release dates by 96 days.  However, the R2 value 
indicates the proportion of the variation in delay being explained by the model is very 
low. 
For the subset of the films which earned over US$10 million revenue at the US box 
office, presented in the right hand column of Table 2, the equation is such a poor fit to the 
data it strongly suggests no relationship between parallel importing and shorter delay in 
the arrival of films in New Zealand cinemas relative to the US. The intercept term 
indicates high-earning films have shorter delays after controlling for parallel importing, 
as might be expected. 
Taken together, these suggest that parallel importing systematically reduces the delay of 
lower-earnings films but not high-earnings films.  This is consistent with the proposition 
that films of no more than moderate sales do not compete with the very high earnings 
films and hence modes of delivery – e.g. DVDs vs cinema – are more competitive for 
box-office hits. It also suggests that there is great value in waiting to find out whether a 
film is a box office hit in the country of first release before implementing a release 
strategy in New Zealand. It may be that box-office hits draw customers earlier in time as 
well as in numbers thereby rendering alternative modes of delivery that have any delay 
ineffective competition. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We have examined the effect of parallel importing on quality as measured by delay in the 
cinematic release of films and the availability of alternative media and presented evidence 
that parallel importing is associated with a significant improvement in quality as 
represented by timing.  The delay in the cinematic release of films was significantly 
longer before and after a period in which parallel importing occurred, and most of this 
change was associated with relatively low-earning films.  The parallel importing of a film 
                                                
44 Excluding films from Lord of the Rings. For an explanation see footnote 27.  
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on DVD significantly reduced cinematic admissions but had a negligible effect on price. 
Consumers value variety and the number of films released in NZ cinemas fell during the 
transition period after the ban on renting parallel imported DVDs was clarified in 2001, 
but this is consistent with the re-introduction of longer delays in local release and long 
run changes in the variety of films in cinemas cannot be inferred from the evidence.  We 
found no evidence that parallel importing reduced the variety of films released in 
cinemas.  Consumers value advertising expenditure because it lowers search costs.  To 
the extent parallel importing undermines marginal revenues earned from advertising, 
consumers may be detrimentally affected by a reduction in the promotion of films by 
licensed distributors.  
These results indicate that the overall effect of introducing parallel importing in the New 
Zealand film sector was to increase welfare.  In particular, our assessment suggests 
consumers enjoyed benefits from parallel importing in the earlier release of films in all 
relevant media, that they substituted to other media (DVDs), and that, on evidence and 
argument, there would have been only limited costs.  The distinction between rental and 
purchase of DVDs under legislation arbitrarily raised transactions costs for consumers 
materially limiting the benefits of parallel importation. 
While the implications of this study for the assessment of vertical restraints within an 
economy cannot be translated directly to welfare considerations of national territorial 
restrictions, they do represent the sort of quantification that Rey and Stiglitz (1995) argue 
is missing in the evaluation of the efficiency of territorial restrictions. The study 
illustrates that delays in distribution may well have important welfare connotations in 
some industries; and it suggests that the DVD market constrains the cinematic market. 
Both of these may be useful in assessing the efficiency of vertical restraints in some 
particular markets. However, vertical restrictions may address particular retail problems 
rendering a general rule about their desirability problematic.45 Although the same may 
apply across nations, the transactions costs, even feasibility of, adjudication of individual 
international cases suggests that uniform parallel importation rules may be efficient. 
The issue of parallel importing can only grow in importance as the means of rapid 
dissemination of information products grow and the ability of rights-holders to recoup 
investment across markets, rather than across time, improves in modern economies. Our 
results suggest considerable welfare gains may arise from not imposing rules that impede 
consumer access. This conclusion applies to economies that are sufficiently small that 
their actions do not affect investment in film making. 
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APPENDIX: DATA SOURCES  
US box office receipts are taken from www.boxofficereport.com. This database includes 
films that earn more than US$10 million in US cinemas.  New Zealand box office 
revenues are from the New Zealand Motion Picture Distributors Association.  Both New 
Zealand and US box office revenues are deflated by nominal disposable income in New 
Zealand and the US, and we take the natural logarithm of both.  Our hypothesis is that 
box office revenue growth is a positive function of disposable income.  We deflate films 
box office revenue by the annual deflator for year in which the film is released in each 
country. 
Parallel import data is obtained from a video store in Wellington New Zealand, United 
Video Courtenay Place, which has computer records of all DVDs imported since 1997 
including the date of their arrival.  All Region 1 DVDs are assumed to be parallel imports 
since, to our knowledge no mainstream films DVDs were released locally by licensed 
distributors on the Region 1 format. 
We have 185 observations for films first released between 1997 and 2003, of which 59 
were parallel imported.  The first parallel import is recorded as arriving 31 March 1999 
and the last on 2 November 2001. 
The data for the subsidiary (timing equation relating to E) consist of the set of all films 
released in the US and New Zealand with US release dates between 1 January 1997 and 
31 December 2002 as recorded by www.imdb.com.  
